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Forc 11 6y Stephen ThoRson
T h e  "G re a t  W a r"  Letters: Im ag in atio n  and Truth
All of the "Great W ar" letters have not survived. Most 
of those that have survived were written by Lewis and 
preserved by Barfield.15
In what must be one of the first surviving letters Lewis 
began in his typical manner by distinguishing two uses for 
the term "truth." On the one hand, he said, it can be an 
object or fact; on the other, it can be the "mental complex" 
related to that fact. " I say a complex because when we 
know, we always know that, etc. (an accusative with the 
infinitive)..." Notice that from the very beginning Lewis 
has limited truth to propositional statements that we can 
"know ." To be even more specific, he usually spoke of 
truth in terms of a true-false statement (whether a certain 
statement is true or false). We cannot say that emotions or 
bodies are true or false, because the concept does not apply 
to the things themselves. We can only say whether a 
certain statement about them is true or false.
The question at hand was whether or not the truth- 
falsehood concept could be applied to Imagination. Of 
course, Lewis said, it does not apply to "ordinary 
imagination," the mere "image-makingfaculty." Ordinary 
images merely invented by conscious effort cannot beTrue 
in any sense of the term. But what about poetic 
imagination (i.e. Imagination as experienced by both 
Lewis and Barfield, and as described in the Surmna)? Lewis 
pointed out that both he and Barfield had experienced the 
images appearing after poetic imagination "ebbs." And 
those images cannot be different from ordinary images; 
like them, they are not in that class of things about which 
we can use the word Truth. Lewis did suggest, however, 
that Truth might pertain to some imageless state of 
Imagination "wherein the light of sense goes out."
Furthermore, and more importantly for Lewis' view of 
knowledge, any "sediment" of explicit assertion left with the 
sediment of images could not be true-or-false either. Even if 
the assertion is true, it could not be the same truth as seen in 
poetic imagination; otherwise, how does poetic imagination 
differ from normal judgement? He likened "the crossing of 
the frontier" between the inspired and uninspired states to 
the blurring that takes place "when you change the focus of 
your telescope." Summing up his argument so far, Lewis 
said, "Granting the truth of poetical imagination, we can 
never argue from it to the truth of any judgement which 
springs up in the mind as it returns to normal consciousness."
Therefore, Lewis asserted, 1) even if we are sure that 
we know in poetic imagination, we can't be sure of what 
we know, and 2) poetic imagination is not in the class of 
things to which True-False can be applied. Lewis hastened 
to add, however, that he did not deny value to poetic 
imagination merely because it does not have the kind of 
Truth he had been talking about. Morality and Beauty do 
not have Truth in that sense, either. He quoted Sidney to 
the effect that poets do not lie, because they never assert.
Barfield's answer has fortunately been preserved. 
Indeed, it is in this letter that he most clearly showed the 
difference between his thought and Lewis'. First of all, 
Barfield refused to accept Lewis' limited definition of the 
term "Truth." 'Truth to you... is something you look at... 
while reality is something you are but never see," he said. 
Barfield did not define Truth as an "accurate copy or 
reflection" of reality, but as reality itself "taking the form 
of human consciousness." Secondly, he used an argument 
we might call metaphysical since it was based on his view 
of the soul's evolution from Spirit. In it he drew a diagram 
to explain how "Inspiration, or 'supersensible" 
experience, light of sense going out,' etc., is a sort of 
withdrawal from A into that-which-is-in-process-of- 
becoming A, wherein I find that I am also in (i.e. become 
one with) that-which-is-in-process-of-becoming B." There 
is a similar argument in Barfield's Replicit to Lewis' Summa 
in which he attacked Lewis' use of the enjoyment/ 
contemplation distinction. There he pointed out that 
Imagination could be called "con-enjoyment", since it 
involves moving back toward Spirit from pure soulhood. 
In both the letter and the later Replicit the inference is plain. 
Inspiration or "con-enjoyment" must mean seeing Truth 
from Spirit's perspective.
Third, Barfield considered the logical process itself to 
be inadequate to deal with reality. Since terms change their 
meaning when passing through time or between people, 
a term is an "arbitrary cross-section of the process taldng 
place in time." Terms must be "artificially taken out of 
time" to be used, while reality continues to change, he said. 
Therefore, since most sentences are both true and untrue, 
logical statements cannot truly be a vehicle of anything 
worthy of the name of knowledge or truth. In other words, 
Barfield thought a limiting of Truth to the logical sphere 
alone (as Lewis did) was not only inadequate, but ques­
tioned whether the terms knowledge or truth could be 
applied to the logical sphere at all. Restating the argument
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from his thesis, Barfield noted that terms "perpetually tend 
to lose their meaning and become tautologous," but could 
recover their meaning "at the fount of inspiration, flowing 
through imagination." In fact, as we saw earlier, Barfield 
claimed that inspiration and imagination are required 
intermediate steps between reality and terms, or between 
reality and metaphor.
Barfield agreed with Lewis that one can't argue from 
the truth of poetical imagination to the truth of any 
judgment that remains in the mind when it has returned 
to normal consciousness. However, Barfield believed that 
Anthroposophical training could overcome this problem, 
allowing the poet to retain fully the judgment he had in 
normal consciousness throughout an experience of poetic 
imagination. He again pointed Lewis toward Steiner's 
"systematic imagination" which could train the mind to 
observe its own activity. The underlying spiritual reality 
is not truth actual, Barfield said, but only truth potential, 
needing the Imagination to act upon it first.
Barfield had insisted in his thesis that the poet creates 
or re-creates primary meaning through the use of 
metaphor. "The progress is from Meaning [notice the 
capital] through inspiration to imagination, and from 
imagination through metaphor, to meaning" (PD, 141). 
Lewis seized Barfield's emphasis on meaning and 
developed a distinction that he was never later to deny.
First, Lewis asked the question whether "knowledge" 
is a what or a that. He wished to distinguish between two 
different kinds of knowledge, the knowledge what 
something is like and the knowledge that something exists 
in fact. Since Barfield had also denied the truth of bald 
statements made after poetic imagination was over, Lewis 
thought they both agreed that metaphor may develop a 
what (in the hearer), but not demonstrate a that. Two 
people can share what something may be like by 
imagination, but disagree as to whether that "whatness" 
represents actual reality. With that, Lewis dropped the 
term "knowledge" almost completely. He preferred to 
distinguish between "meaning" (what something is like) 
and "truth" (whether something exists).16
To imagine what a statement would mean no more 
vouches for its validity than rival hypotheses in the mind 
of the scientist. Nothing can be either true or false unless 
it first means something; but to know what something 
means does not help one to know whether it is true or false. 
Metaphor can be used in prose arguments, as well. But 
even a good metaphor can only show the meaning in a 
point of view; it cannot show it to be well-founded. There­
fore, poetic imagination can give meaning to a proposition 
(what it would mean, i f  true), but does not tell if it is true.
Lewis and Barfield continued to differ over the essen­
tial nature of truth and metaphor. Lewis denied the use of 
the term "truth" for the kind of knowledge that Barfield 
insisted Imagination (and metaphor) revealed. But he did 
accept the term "meaning" for that kind of knowledge.
Barfield, however, wished to maintain that Imagination 
produces Truth, and ultimately could lead to both meaning 
and true statements; that Anthroposophical training could 
lead to true propositional statements about the reality seen 
in moments of poetic imagination or inspiration.
We have seen how Lewis' high view of Imagination as 
Spiritual Awareness in Part II of the Summa was firmly based 
on his view of Being in Part I. We began our examination of 
the "Great War" letters because they clarified the serious 
clash which appears at the end of the Summa between Lewis' 
concept of Imagination and his concept of epistemology. We 
now can see the broad movement of Lewis' thought as the 
"Great War" progressed. The debate began over Barfield's 
epistemology ("how we know"), which had been based on 
Steiner's Anthroposophy. Lewis continued to argue against 
this view, strengthened by Alexander's enjoyment/con- 
templation distinction, while at the same time coming to accept 
both Barfield's view of metaphysics (man's Being as a soul 
emerging from Spirit of which it is a part) and Barfield's high 
Coleridgean view of Imagination!
Let us look at the main arguments of the Summa. In 
brief summary, Lewis proposed:
1. The soul emerges from Spirit, of which it is a part. 
The world of Nature also emerges from Spirit, and 
therefore "is the creation of what I, at some level, am."
2. We cannot both enjoy and contemplate at the same 
time, for the Spirit is the contemplating self and the soul is 
the enjoying self.
3. But we can, by Imagination, "see all things as Spirit 
sees," and "will all things as Spirit w ills," and this is our 
ideal function as souls. Imagination, like all modes of the 
spiritual life, is a Spiritual Awareness or consciousness of 
one's participation in Spirit and (therefore) in all that 
seems external to us.
4. However, since we cannot both enjoy Imaginative 
experience and contemplate whether it is true at the same 
time, knowledge of truth or falsehood must be objectively 
demonstrated. The most we can say is that Imagination 
conveys the "meaning" or concrete "whatness" of 
something, but it cannot tells us "that" such is factually 
true or exists.
5. Therefore, although we can get meaning, we cannot 
get truth by Imagination alone.
Barfield accurately observed that points #1 (Lewis'' 
view of Being) and #3 (his view of Imagination) 
contradicted point #2, suggesting that the enjoyment/ 
contemplation distinction presented there was wrong. 
Eventually, however, Lewis denied points #1 and #3 
instead! In my earlier paper (see Note 6 in Part I of this article), 
Lewis' denial of the view of Being presented in Part I of his 
Summa was emphasized. In the rest of this article, we will 
examine Lewis' eventual denial of the high view of Im­
agination he had presented in Part II.
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L ew is P o st-C o n v ersio n : Im ag in atio n  in  the Psyche
After his conversion, Lewis' philosophy changed radi­
cally. The first indications of this change appeared in his 
later annotations to the Sutnma. These annotations must 
have been written in 1930 or, at the latest, early in 1931. 
These later notes provide evidence for the early develop­
ment (shortly after his conversion to Theism) of Lewis' new 
concepts of Creation and the Incarnation. But they also 
show the beginnings of a new view of imagination as well.
In his Summa the conception of the relationship 
between artistic creation and the creation of the world had 
been very similar to that of Coleridge. He had originally 
written, 'T h e  analogy between cosmic and artistic creation 
is more than analogy, the latter being simply the lowest 
grade of the former" (Part I, Sec.x). The later annotation to 
this was "NEGO, it is an imperfect analogy." Another 
annotation commented further, "The whole difference 
between an artist's creation (and pre-existing mind) and 
real cosmic creation is neglected."17 In other words, Lewis 
was beginning to see a difference in kind between creation 
by God and "creation" by an artist via imagination.
This distinction became a major part of Lewis' post­
conversion view of imagination. Unlike Barfield and 
Coleridge, then, Lewis believed that artists imitate reality; 
they do not create it. Indeed, in his early essay, "Chris­
tianity and Literature," Lewis insisted that only such 
words as "imitation" or "reflection" correctly describe the 
artist's work. "An author should never conceive himself 
as bringing into existence beauty or wisdom which did not 
exist before, but simply and solely as trying to embody in 
terms of his own art some reflection of eternal Beauty and 
W isdom" (CP, 5-7).
A year later in 1940 Lewis published a related essay, 
titled "Christianity and Culture." Of crucial importance 
for his new view of imagination, this essay marked the first 
appearance in print of Lewis' contention that the soul and 
spirit are not the same. Lewis actually wrote "Christianity 
and Culture" in response to an article by George Every in 
the March 1939 issue of Theology. Brother Every had 
appeared to suggest that "culture" and "good taste" in 
literature were spiritual values. Lewis claimed to be 
appalled. "M y fear was lest excellence in reading and 
writing were being elevated into a spiritual value" (CR, 
28). He responded to Every by making his crucial distinc­
tion between the soul and the spirit of man. "W e should 
be cured at the outset of our inveterate confusion between 
psyche and pneuma, nature and supemature" (CR, 13). 
Using this distinction between soul and spirit, he denied 
that cultural things were spiritual. "Culture is a storehouse 
of the best (sub-Christian) values. These values are in 
themselves of the soul, not the spirit. But God created the 
soul. Its values may be expected, therefore, to contain some 
reflection or antepast of the spiritual values" (CR, 23).
This, then, was his clearest statement of the new place 
imagination was to have in his post-conversion thought.
Imagination no longer remained the highest form of the 
spiritual life, no longer could be called Spiritual Aware­
ness. Rather, imagination (small "i") had become a lower 
faculty, able to reflect spiritual values, but not "spiritual" 
itself. Lewis consistently maintained this in all his 
subsequent writings. For example, late in his life he 
explained his view thus, " I think that all things, in their 
way, reflect heavenly truths, the imagination not least. 
'Reflect' is the important word. This lower life of the 
imagination is not a beginning, nor a step toward the 
higher life of the spirit, merely an image" (ShJ, 167).
This was based, of course, on his acceptance of a true 
creation of man as other than God, and his distinction 
between the soul and spirit of man. Prior to his conversion 
he had talked of the individual man's soul emerging from 
the universal Spirit. But after his conversion Lewis firmly 
believed man to consist of three parts —  body, soul and 
spirit, all three being creations of God. (See Note 10.)
And Lewis placed the imagination of man in the realm 
of the soul, not the spirit.18 In fact, Lewis believed that the 
soul had its own subjective or psychological "w orld", the 
immaterial world of emotions, passions, memory, and 
imagination. In his Allegory o f Love he studied the 
descriptions of this "world" that are found in medieval 
allegory, first in straight allegorical personifications, but 
later in a new and subtler way. He pointed to the rise from 
within the allegorical love poems of "something else" 
which "lurks at the back of most romantic poetry. I mean 
the 'other world' not of religion, but of imagination" (AoL, 
75). "W e are apt," he said, "to take for granted that a poet 
has at his command, besides the actual world and the 
world of his own religion, a third world of myth and fancy 
(AoL, 82). It is clear, then, that even shortly after his 
conversion, (The Allegory o f  Love was published in 1936) 
Lewis was beginning to distinguish the world of the 
imagination from the spiritual realm.
This distinction can actually be seen developing in 
Lewis' mind during his long controversy with E.M.W. 
Tillyard over "The Personal Heresy." Although the essays 
were eventually collected in book form in 1939, Lewis' first 
essay was written during the later stages of the "Great 
W ar" and presented to the Martlets in March 1930. The fact 
of relevance to this discussion is that Lewis' description of 
poetry in this first essay differs considerably from the one 
in his last (fifth) essay, written many years later. Lewis 
pointed this out himself in a note appended to the book 
form of the essays:
In the First we are told that the poet puts together 'scraps 
of ordinary seeing' in such a way as to produce a new 
mode of consciousness. This new mode sees objects more 
'synthetically', and with a 'vaster context' than we usually 
attain. It is described as being 'racial'; and a subject who 
enjoyed it habitually would be superhuman. In the Fifth 
Essay poetry consists in a special use of language which 
exploits its extra-logical properties so as to convey the 
concrete. (PH, 146)
C p y T H L O R G
Lewis tried to unify the two seemingly unrelated concepts 
by observing that the first deals with "the poetic process 
('seeing' and 'saying')" while the second deals with "the 
poetic object or content (the thing 'seen' and 'said')."
But he realized he could not remove a major inconsis­
tency regarding the essential nature of poetic imagination. 
In the first essay the poetic consciousness had been 
identified with either "racial" or "angelic" consciousness, 
while in the last essay it was considered to be on a "much 
lower plane" —  seemingly limited to merely conveying 
the concrete reality of experiences that are common to all 
men.
To speak more plainly, I have assumed (i) what now seems 
tome very unlikely, that large groups of human individuals 
possess a common consciousness; and (ii) that if they do, 
this common consciousness would be so superior to that 
of the individuals that it might be called 'angelic'. In fact,
1 have exaggerated. (PH,147, italics added)
He went on to admit that he only hacTa "right" to say that 
poets use "memories, associations, and values" that are 
widely distributed among all men, rejecting whatis "mere­
ly idiosyncratic." No human being, of course, constantly 
"enjoys" poetic imagination.
With our knowledge of the "Great W ar," we can see 
that the first essay represented more of the pre-Christian 
views of the Summa and the last essay more of Lewis' 
mature Christian thought. The "common consciousness" 
of man can only refer to his former view that all souls are 
essentially one in Spirit. In addition, the quotation 
provides further evidence that Lewis had accepted for a 
time Barfield's contention that poetic imagination involves 
the soul's "ascent" back toward Spirit, i.e. the poet ex­
periencing poetic imagination essentially occupies a posi­
tion in between universal Spirit and individual soul. By the 
time these essays were published in book form, however, 
Lewis realized that he no longer held those beliefs.
Lewis' contributions to The Personal Heresy are full of 
concepts he had developed during his "Great W ar" with 
Barfield. In fact, the main contention of the titular essay is 
based on the enjoyment/ contemplation distinction— that 
readers should not try to mix "imaginative apprehension" 
of a poem or drama with "unpoetic reflection" about the 
poet himself.
To see things as the poet sees them I must share his 
consciousness and not attend to it: I must look where he 
looks and not turn round to face him: I must make of him 
not a spectacle but a pair of spectacles: in fine, as Professor 
Alexander would say, I must enjoy him and not con­
template him. (PH, 12)
Of equal importance was Lewis' continued assertion that 
meaning and truth must be distinguished. A poem may 
tell us what a certain person in a certain situation is like, he 
said, but not that that the poet himself is like that, or even 
if such a person actually exists at all.
Unlike his later rejection of a "racial" consciousness,
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though, Lewis never rejected this last concept. It is explicit­
ly supported in the fifth essay. For example, he defined 
poetic language there as language used "to convey the 
concrete reality of experience" (PH, 108). To support this 
further, Lewis claimed that whatever is concrete is real, 
"i.e. a real something, though not necessarily the thing it 
pretends to be: e.g. what pretends to be a crocodile may be 
a (real) dream; what pretends at the breakfast-table to be a 
dream may be a (real) lie." Therefore, poetry does not tell 
us whether the particular things she describes actually 
exist; poetry "answers the question What", while science 
"answers the question Whether." Lewis ended his last 
essay in the controversy by proposing that the value of 
poetry resides 1) in its being enjoyable, interesting and 
attractive, and 2) in its ability to help or hinder us toward 
all the other things that we would like to do (PH, 119-120).
This emphasis on what a poem does to the readers was 
to remain prominent in Lewis' criticism, eventually 
providing the stimulus for his much later work, An 
Experiment in Criticism. Even a casual reading would reveal 
that the view of literature expressed in the later book is 
little different from that expressed earlier. Here again is an 
emphasis on the reader sharing the author's consciousness 
(or using his "spectacles" or looking through his "win­
dow") in order to view something else (EC, 137-139). Here 
is a similar emphasis on the "whatness" of the author's 
experience, whether it is true historically or not. "What 
matters is his power to make us live it" (EC, 139). It is not 
a question of knowing that at all. If it is "knowing", it is 
connaitre ("knowledge by acquaintance"), not savoir 
("knowledge that"). We may "know " (connaitre) many 
things that do not exist, he said, because we have met them 
in great literature. "M y own eyes are not enough for me, I 
will see through those of others. Reality, even seen through 
the eyes of many, is not enough. I will see what others have 
invented" (EC, 140).
W hat then, Lewis asked, is the good of "occupying our 
hearts" with stories that never happened or "entering 
vicariously" into feelings that would be immoral to 
harbour in ourselves? "The nearest that I have yet got to 
an answer is that we seek an enlargement of our being. We 
want to be more than ourselves" (EC, 137). In the following 
pages Lewis proceeded to resurrect his earlier concept of 
imagination as a "multiplying of consciousness." But this 
was no longer the consciousness of Spirit but of the in­
dividual soul of man. Nor was this multiplying of 
consciousness to add "richness to the life of Spirit," but to 
add richness to the life of each individual man:
Each of us by nature sees the whole world from one point
of view with a perspective and a selectiveness peculiar to
himself... We want to see with other eyes, to imagine with
other imaginations, to feel with other hearts, as well as
with our own.
A little further on, he used another concept from the 
Summa, but again in a new way. "Obviously this process 
can be described either as an enlargem ent or as a
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temporary annihilation of the self. But that is an old
paradox; Tie that loseth his life shall save it" ' (EC, 138).
Lewis well understood, and in some sense shared, the 
sensibility of the English Romantics —  that alienation of 
man from the world of Nature, and of man from man. For 
awhile Lewis had accepted a view of soul and Spirit that 
overcame that alienation philosophically, and seemed to 
give him a metaphysical base for what happened to him 
experientially during moments of imagination. He later 
rejected the metaphysical base, but could not reject what 
he had experienced from imaginative literature. Although 
modified and less pretentious, his post-conversion view of 
imagination still allowed him many of the benefits of his 
old view. Imaginative experience in literature, he said: 
heals the wound, without undermining the privilege, of 
individuality... In reading great literature I become a 
thousand men and yet remain myself. Like the night sky 
in the Greek poem, I see with a myriad eyes, but it is still 
I who see. Here, as in worship, in love, in moral action, 
and in knowing, I transcend myself; and am never more 
myself than when I do. (EC, 140-141)
Ultimately then, if imagination did not keep its former 
status as the highest form of the spiritual life, it did retain 
a very high position indeed in Lewis' view of literature.
But Lewis did not limit the value of literature to its 
particular intrinsic goodness as an "expansion of being," 
There was another "good" possible as well. For that, we 
must now return to Lewis' essay, "Christianity and Cul­
ture." Lewis had begun on a biographical note. "At an early 
age I came to believe that the life of culture (that is, of 
intellectual and aesthetic activity) was very good for its own 
sake, or even that it was good for man." He went on:
After my conversion I continued to hold this belief 
without consciously asking how it could be reconciled 
with my new belief that the end of human life was salva­
tion in Christ and the glorifying of God. I was awakened 
from this confused state of mind by finding that the 
friends of culture seemed to me to be exaggerating. (CR,12)
It is interesting to observe the term "exaggeration" used 
exactly as he had used it in his added Note to The Personal 
Heresy. They were written only a year apart, of course. 
Lewis was convinced that his former view of poetic 
imagination was not completely wrong; only that it had 
claimed too much.
The first half of "Christianity and Culture" dealt with 
his search to find a Christian sanction for the pursuit of 
culture —  in his own case, literary culture. He concluded 
by saying:
My researches left me with the impression that there 
could be no question of restoring to culture the kind of 
status which I had given it before my conversion. If any 
constructive case for culture was to be built up it would 
have to be of a much humbler kind... (CR, 19)
Lewis then attempted to build a "case for culture." He 
sought an ethical reason for engaging in cultural or literary
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activity, one that would be consistent with his Christian 
beliefs. He had begun the essay by denying a higher 
"spiritual" value to cultural activities. "The work of a 
charwoman and the work of a poet become spiritual in the 
same way and on the same condition... Let us stop giving 
ourselves airs." He described the value of culture more 
humbly: Although not spiritual in themselves, cultural or 
literary activities may well be a road toward the spiritual.
He pointed to his own conversion as an example of the 
best one could hope for from cultural pursuit. Lewis 
believed that his experiences of Joy or "Romantic 
Sehnsuchf' were crucial to his conversion. "Without them 
my conversion would have been more difficult," he said 
in the essay. While such experiences may well lead in the 
opposite direction (and often has, he observed), for some 
it will lead them to Christ and Christianity. The best 
experiences and values of literature may be "sub- 
Christian", but they reflect or imitate spiritual ones. 
"Though 'like is not the same', it is better than unlike. 
Imitation may pass into initiation. For some it is a good 
beginning," he said (CR, 23).
Both of Lewis' autobiographies, The Pilgrim's Regress 
and Surprised by Joy, were written to show how the ex­
perience of Sehnsucht or Desire or Joy provided just such a 
"good beginning." He even sub-titled the first, An 
Allegorical Apology for Qiristianity, Reason and Romanticism. 
Camell has pointed out that Lewis' (final) concept of Joy 
or Sehnsucht was a much humbler variety than the Roman­
tics usually claimed. He accurately observed that Lewis' 
view "can destroy Romanticism only for those who have 
enthroned it as God. Its proper validity as a way 
remains."20 Although Lewis said in Surprised by Joy, "This 
lower life of the imagination is not a beginning of, nor a 
step toward, the higher life of the spirit," he also added a 
footnote: "i.e. not necessarily and by its own nature. God 
can cause it to be such a beginning" (SbJ, 167).
We may summarize the article in this way. There were 
two parts to Lewis' move away from his views of the 
Summa toward his post-conversion views. First, Lewis 
moved the Spirit of man from its position as God to being 
a part of creation made by God; capitalized Spirit became 
a small spirit. Second, and based on the first, Lewis moved 
imagination from the realm of "Spirit" to the psyche; 
capitalized Imagination became small imagination. For he 
ended up believing imagination to be psychological, not 
spiritual —  however it may be defined. Imagination 
became for Lewis neither "Spiritual" in the sense of 
"seeing as Spirit sees" (no longer an option in his new view 
of man's Being), nor spiritual in the religious sense (he 
placed man's Reason and Conscience, but not his imagina­
tion, in the created spirit of man). However, Lewis did 
leave room for imagination to be a way toward the spiritual 
in the religious sense —  if God used it in such a way. ¥
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(All references to Lewis' and Barfield's works in this essay
are cited parenthetically in the text, using the abbrevia­
tions listed below.)
Lew is' books Cited
AoL The Allegory of Love. 1936. New York: Oxford UP, 1958.
CR Christum Reflections. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967.
EC An Experiment in Criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1961.
GiD God in the Dock. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970.
L The Letters o f C.S. Lewis. New York: Harcourt, 1966.
PH The Personal Heresy. With E.M.W. Tillyard. London: Oxford 
UP, 1939.
M Miracles. Rev. ed. 1960. London: Collins-Fount, 1977.
PR The Pilgrim's Regress. Rev. ed. 1943. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1958.
Sb] Surprised by Joy. 1955. New York: Harcourt, 1956.
SiB Spirits in Bondage. 1919. New York: Harcourt, 1984.
SM RL S tu d ies  in M ed iev a l an d  R en a issa n ce  L iteratu re . 
Cambridge: UP, 1966.
TST They Stand Together. New York: Macmillan, 1979.
WG The Weight o f Glory. Rev. & Exp. ed. New York: Macmillian,
1980.
Barfield 's Books Cited
PD Poetic Diction: A Study in Meaning-. 3rd ed. London: Faber & 
Faber, 1965.
RCA Romanticism Comes o f Age. 2nd ed. 1966. Middletown, CT: 
Wesleyan UP, 1967.
SA Saving the Appearances: A Study in Idolatry. 1957. New York: 
Harcourt, n.d.
WCT What Coleridge Thought. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1971.
Notes
15. All quotes from the "Great War" materials in this artide are from 
previously published excerpts. Unless stated otherwise, they appear 
either in my article, "Knowing and Being in CS. Lewis’ 'Great War' 
with Owen Barfield," CSL: The Bulletin of the New York CS. Lewis 
Society, 169 (Nov.1983), 1-8; or in Lionel Adey’s book, C.S.Lewis's 
"Great War" with Owen Barfield English Literary Studies 
Monograph Series 14 (Victoria, B.C.: University of Victoria, 1978). My 
own tentative chronology would differ from that of Adey's in his 
monograph.
16. During the "Great War," Lewis used the terms "meaning" and "truth."
He would continue to use these two terms throughout most of his 
life. However, the terms were not the important thing. The important 
concept was the distinction between the "whatness" or "concrete­
ness" or "quiddity" of things and the statements "that" such things 
existed. During the "Great War," he called this "whatness" by the 
term meaning, and "thatness" by the term truth. Elsewhere, he used 
reality for the "whatness" and truth again for the "thatness" (GiD, 
66-67). Once, in The Pilgrim's Regress, he used the terms truth and 
image for the "whatness" and the terms fact and very real for the 
"thatness" (PR,170). This is only confusing if one does not see that in 
The Pilgrim's Regress, Lewis was in some sense distinguishing "truth" 
and "fact." The important distinction is the same, between the mean­
ing and the fact of existence.
17. Quoted in my letter, "A Reply [to Lionel Adey]." CSL: The Bulletin of 
the New York C.S. Lewis Society, 173 (March 1984), 10-11.
18. For examples, see Appendix A to Lewis' Miracles, pp. 175-176, and his 
Screwtape Letters, pp. 36-37.
19. Seeasimilar discussion of savoir and conna/tre in Lewis'"DeAudiendis
Poetis," (SMRL, 11).
20. Corbin S. Camell, Bright Shadow of Reality: C.S. Lewis and the Feeling 
Intellect (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974) 148.
CUaR and  O u r  PRioRiries continued from page 4
To be able accept this invitation is a supreme honor, 
whether the duration is — as for the m ayfly— a day, or for 
those fortunate few, a century. The duration is a minor 
consideration, almost an irrelevance, compared with the 
richness of the invitation itself. Yet in the end, the party for 
each individual must end, and we must come to terms with 
the fact that eventually it will be time to leave. C.S. Lewis' 
grave is inscribed with the quote from Sheakespeare: "Men 
must endure their going hence." The tragedy is not that the 
party must end, but that so many do not recognize that it 
is a party at all! They become distracted by the annoyances 
and hardships of life. It is as if they have gone to the verdant 
countryside in May to have a picnic, and then complain that 
there are some ants present, or that a crow is in the trees, or 
that they didn't bring all the right drinks. They ignore the 
glorious weather, the flowers in bloom, the fresh breeze, the 
presence of good friends. We all pay too much attention to 
the ants sometimes, which in fact can bite, instead of look­
ing at the flowers and feeling the breeze.
For many of us, faith gives us the hope that beyond the 
end of this "party" there is something more and better. And 
in this light, the invitation to life holds concealed within it 
a second invitation to an unending celebration where the 
good that was merely inferred here will become reality 
with a diamond-like solidity.
Lewis in The Great Divorce and Tolkien in his unique 
classic "Leaf by Niggle" —  along with scatterings in 
Williams —  give us what they sense this may be like. This 
affirmation is the key ingredient to Joy; it gives the valida­
tion and focus to what our very desires point to. Whether 
or not this life is the final word is up to the choice of the 
individual to accept this second invitation. Despite war, 
injustice, and death, those who can see beyond to share the 
Inklings' vision, can repeat with the same gratitude what 
Niggle said: "It's a gift!"
------  Glen GoodKnight
